Priority for the Worse Off and the Social Cost of Carbon by Adler, Matthew D. et al.
 Priority for the Worse Off and the 
Social Cost of Carbon 
 
 
 
Matthew Adler David Anthoff 
Valentina Bosetti  Greg Garner 
Klaus Keller  Nicolas Treich 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 6032 
CATEGORY 10: ENERGY AND CLIMATE ECONOMICS 
AUGUST 2016 
 
 
 
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 
• from the CESifo website:           Twww.CESifo-group.org/wp T 
 
 
 
ISSN 2364-1428 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6032 
 
 
 
Priority for the Worse Off and the 
Social Cost of Carbon 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a monetary measure of the harms from carbon emission. 
Specifically, it is the reduction in current consumption that produces a loss in social welfare 
equivalent to that caused by the emission of a ton of CO2. The standard approach is to calculate 
the SCC using a discounted-utilitarian social welfare function (SWF)—one that simply adds up 
the well-being numbers (utilities) of individuals, as discounted by a weighting factor that 
decreases with time. The discounted-utilitarian SWF has been criticized both for ignoring the 
distribution of well-being, and for including an arbitrary preference for earlier generations. Here, 
we use a prioritarian SWF, with no time-discount factor, to calculate the SCC in the integrated 
assessment model RICE. Prioritarianism is a well-developed concept in ethics and theoretical 
welfare economics, but has been, thus far, little used in climate scholarship. The core idea is to 
give greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse off individuals. We find substantial 
differences between the discounted-utilitarian and non-discounted prioritarian SCC. 
JEL-Codes: Q540. 
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 ARTICLE TEXT 
 Evaluating climate policy requires a method for navigating trade-offs, for example by 
balancing costs and benefits.  The most systematic such method is the “social welfare function” 
(SWF) approach, which is widely used in the economic analysis of climate change1–4, as well as 
many other areas of economics5–8. The core idea of the SWF approach is to convert information 
about an individual’s attributes (material consumption, health, longevity, environmental 
conditions, etc.) into a univariate measure of individual well-being, using some well-being 
function u(.).  The status quo can then be represented as a pattern of individual well-being 
numbers, and policy choices as perturbations to this pattern.   
 Various formulas can be used to compare well-being patterns.  By far the dominant 
approach in scholarship on climate policy is to use a discounted-utilitarian SWF3. Well-being 
numbers are multiplied by a weighting factor which decreases over time (sometimes referred to 
as a “utility discount factor” or as “pure time preference”).  These time-discounted well-being 
numbers are then added up.  The best policy maximizes the sum of time-discounted well-being. 
 Although widely used, the discounted-utilitarian SWF is controversial.  At least two 
powerful criticisms have been raised against it.  First, the use of the time-discount factor violates 
the ethical axiom of impartiality9.  Harms and benefits to the members of later generations are 
downweighted in the social calculus by virtue of the ethically arbitrary fact that these individuals 
come into existence later in time.  In a pioneering 1928 article on intertemporal social planning, 
Frank Ramsey wrote that time discounting is “ethically indefensible and arises merely from the 
weakness of the imagination”10. Other leading scholars have voiced the same criticism4,11–17. 
 Second, quite apart from the issue of time-discounting, the utilitarian SWF ignores the 
distribution of well-being.  Consider two hypothetical societies.  Let U be a low level of well-
being.  In the first society, half the society is at level U, while the other half is much better off, at 
3U.  In a second, equally sized but perfectly egalitarian society, everyone is at level 2U − ε.  The 
utilitarian SWF says that the first society is better, for any value of ε greater than 0.  Many find 
this to be a troubling conclusion18. If we consider not only efficiency (total well-being), but also 
equity (fair distribution), it seems quite plausible that the second society is better for at least 
some range of positive ε.  
 Here, we explore the implications for climate policy of a different type of SWF: the non-
discounted “prioritarian” SWF7,19. The key idea of “prioritarianism” is to give greater weight to 
well-being changes affecting worse off individuals.  This is accomplished by summing well-
being numbers transformed via a concave transformation (see Figure 1).  
 [Insert Figure 1 here.  All figures are in the Figures section at the end of this document.] 
The non-discounted prioritarian SWF avoids the two criticisms of utilitarianism discussed above.  
This SWF lacks a time discount factor and is thus impartial between generations.  Moreover, the 
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non-discounted prioritarian SWF gives greater weight to a well-being benefit incurred by a 
worse-off individual, and thus prefers an equal distribution of well-being to an unequal 
distribution of the same total amount. 
 There is now a substantial body of scholarship on the topic of prioritarianism, in 
academic philosophy20–27 and theoretical welfare economics6,28,29.  The chapter of the most 
recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on ethical concepts and 
methods discusses prioritarianism at some length30.  However, very little work has been yet 
undertaken to see what a non-discounted prioritarian SWF would recommend for climate policy, 
and how these recommendations differ from those of discounted utilitarianism.    
 We begin to fill this gap by comparing the discounted-utilitarian and non-discounted 
prioritarian SWFs with respect to a key aspect of climate policy—the “social cost of carbon” 
(SCC)31–35. The SCC is the reduction in the income of the current generation which is equally 
costly, in terms of social welfare, as the harms caused by emitting a ton of CO2.  The SCC can be 
used to specify a carbon tax, or to determine whether the emission caps in a cap-and-trade policy 
are too permissive.  The US government now uses the SCC to calculate the climate impact of all 
major regulations32,36. Specifically, we calculate and compare the discounted-utilitarian and non-
discounted prioritarian SCCs with the integrated assessment model RICE, arguably the most 
widely used numerical model that can estimate the SCC and has a regional structure37. 
 Our analysis develops the prioritarian framework for climate economics, and advances 
the understanding about the SCC in an area that has been identified as a research priority38. It 
also contributes to a broader conversation about the importance of equity considerations in 
climate policy39–43—a point emphasized by Piketty, famous for his book on income inequality, 
who has more recently examined the distribution of carbon emissions and proposed a progressive 
carbon tax44,45.  
Utilitarianism, Prioritarianism, and the Social Cost of Carbon: Concepts and Parameter Ranges 
 A major debate among climate scholars concerns whether the specification of an SWF is 
“descriptive” or “normative”9,17,46–48. The former approach seeks to avoid ethical judgments, 
while the latter approach frankly incorporates such judgments. We adopt the normative approach 
in this paper. Although some SWF parameters may be identifiable from empirical observation 
(see below, discussing the individual risk-aversion parameter), others may not be, and the basic 
choice of functional form for an SWF is an ethical, not descriptive matter. Scientific observation 
and economic analysis cannot “demonstrate” that a particular SWF is “correct” or “incorrect.”  
Rather, science and economics are important in clarifying the implications of various normative 
frameworks that policymakers or citizens may find normatively appealing49—such as 
utilitarianism or prioritarianism. 
  We follow the standard approach in climate economics and express well-being as a 
function of individual consumption.  (An individual’s “consumption” is the amount of money 
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that she expends on marketed goods and services, and is often proxied by her income.)  In this 
approach, effects on non-consumption attributes (for example, health harms from global 
warming) are assumed to be representable by equivalent consumption changes.  The IAM we 
consider divides the world into regions.  Let Ctr be the total consumption of region r at time t, 
and Ptr its total population. With these inputs, the discounted-utilitarian (DU) SWF, denoted 
WDU, is defined in equation (1).   
(1) 
1
1 1
1
( )
(1 )
T R
DU tr
tr t
t r tr
C
W P u
P   
  

   
 Again in accordance with standard practice, we use a constant-relative-risk-aversion 
(CRRA) well-being function u(c) = 
1 1(1 ) c    or log c for η =1 1,3,4,9,50. The η parameter is 
estimated by looking at evidence of individual preferences.  Specifically, η is a measure of an 
individual’s risk aversion with respect to consumption gambles—her willingness to incur a risk 
of lower consumption levels for the chance of higher ones51.   
 This approach to specifying the well-being function rests upon a prior normative 
commitment to a non-paternalistic view of well-being, the view embraced by welfare economics: 
that an individual’s well-being depends upon her preferences.  Substantial behavioral evidence 
suggests a range of η between 0 and 3, and this is consistent with the range used in climate 
economics.  See Methods for a fuller discussion.  We use a range of 0 to 3 for η, with 1 as the 
central value.  
 The parameter ρ represents pure time preference.  Stern advocates ρ = 0 (except for 
extinction risk)4,46; Nordhaus 1,48  sets ρ = 1.5%; Weitzman suggests ρ = 2% 52. In a survey of 
197 experts on social discounting, Drupp et al.47 find a median value of 0.5%, a mean of 1.1%, 
and a standard deviation of 1.47%. Our analysis considers a range of 0 to 3% for ρ, with 1% as 
the central value. 
 The non-discounted prioritarian SWF, which we are comparing to the standard 
discounted-utilitarian approach, is denoted WNP and uses equation (2). 
(2) 
1
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1 1
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 
 
 
  for γ =1 
 In its most general formulation, the non-discounted prioritarian SWF sums individual 
well-being numbers transformed by a strictly increasing and concave function g(.), as in Figure 
1.  Equation (2) uses a power function for g(.), with 
1 1( *) (1 ) ( *)g u u     .  The power function 
is especially attractive axiomatically, as compared to other functional forms for g(.) 7,19.  The 
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parameter γ captures the degree of priority for individuals at lower well-being levels.  This 
parameter can take any positive value (with γ = 0 the SWF becomes utilitarian), and a larger 
value of γ indicates a greater degree of priority for the worse off.   
 u* is a measure of individual well-being that is unique up to a ratio transformation.  This 
is accomplished, in equation (2), by using the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) well-being 
function and then rescaling by setting u*(c) = u(c) –u(czero) 7,19. See Methods for further 
discussion of this rescaling and the czero parameter. 
 Parameter γ is a pure ethical parameter.  Ethical intuitions about a normatively 
appropriate level of γ can be sharpened via various thought experiments, such as “leaky transfer” 
thought experiments7. Assume that the ratio between the well-being of two individuals is K > 1.  
Consider a policy that produces a small loss to the well-being of the better-off individual, with a 
benefit to the worse-off individual that is some fraction f of that loss.  This “leaky transfer” is 
seen as a net improvement by the non-discounted prioritarian SWF if f > (1/K)γ.  Note that the 
acceptable degree of leakage (1 –f) increases as γ increases.  See Methods for a fuller discussion 
of thought experiments for ethical deliberation about the value of γ.  In our analysis, we use a 
range of 0 to 3 for γ, with 1 as our central value.   
 Parameter czero is constrained to be greater than zero, but no greater than the lowest 
average regional consumption observed for all regions and times (see Methods).  Within this 
range, the choice of czero is, again, an ethical matter.  Consider some individual at a given 
consumption level, and a worse-off individual at a lower level.  As this lower level approaches 
czero, the well-being ratio K between the better and worse off individual increases without bound, 
and thus the acceptable degree of leakage for a well-being transfer between them approaches 
unity.  The level czero is a consumption level so low that those in its vicinity come close to a kind 
of absolute priority over more fortunate persons19.  It is an ethical question what that level is.  
One natural thought is that czero is the subsistence level of consumption, below which ongoing 
existence is seriously at risk. We therefore set our central value of czero equal to $500, suggested 
by the $1.25/day and more recently $1.90/day level of extreme poverty identified by the World 
Bank53. 
 
 We now turn to the social cost of carbon (SCC).  Assume that a ton of emissions at 
present will cause aggregate damage to individuals in region r at time t that is equivalent (in 
terms of their well-being) to the aggregate loss of consumption ∆Ctr for region r at time t.  Then 
the SCC is the change in present consumption for some specified region B (the “normalization 
region”) with the same effect on social welfare as the stream of equivalent consumption changes 
caused by the ton of emissions39.  In other words, the SCC translates emissions into an effect on 
social welfare, and then expresses that effect in terms of the change to the present consumption 
of the normalization region with the very same social welfare impact.  The SCC is calculated 
using equation (3).  This equation is expressed in terms of a generic social welfare function W.  
By combining equation (3) with equation (1) for the discounted-utilitarian SWF, we arrive at the 
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discounted-utilitarian SCC (SCCDU); by combining it, instead, with equation (2), we arrive at the 
non-discounted prioritarian SCC (SCCNP). 
(3) SCCB = 
1 1
1
T R
tr
t r tr
B
W
C
C
W
C
 






  
The term 
tr
W
C


 (the partial derivative of the SWF W as calculated with equation (1) or (2)), 
denotes the increase in social welfare per incremental dollar added to the total consumption of 
region r at time t.   
 Note that the SCC (be it utilitarian or prioritarian) depends on the choice of normalization 
region, as indicated by the “B” subscript to SCC in equation (3).  This is because regions are 
heterogeneous in their per capita consumption, and thus in the social-welfare impact of a 
marginal dollar.  In the case of an IAM with the whole world treated as one region, there is no 
need to specify a normalization region.  However, with IAMs such as RICE, that operate at a 
finer scale of regional detail, this choice is critical.  
The Discounted-Utilitarian and Non-discounted Prioritarian SCC  
 We illustrate the SCC with three normalization regions:  the US, Africa, and a “World-
Fair” normalization which is an aggregate of all the regions.  The SCC calculated with the US as 
normalizing region would be used by a decision maker impartial between the US and other 
regions, and between present and future generations, and setting a price of carbon for policies 
whose costs are wholly borne by present US citizens.  This is of course an ethical idealization; 
actual US policymakers might depart quite substantially from full ethical impartiality and set a 
different (lower) carbon price for policies expected to be “paid for” by US citizens.  The US has 
relatively high consumption; Africa is the poorest region in RICE, and is chosen to illustrate the 
effect of a much lower per-capita income in the normalization region.   
 Finally, World-Fair assumes that the costs of mitigation policies are borne by the present 
generation but spread “fairly” across regions in proportion to total consumption.  That is, 
equation (3*) is used instead of (3) to calculate the SCC. 
(3*)
1 1
1 1
T R
tr
t r tr
WF R
r
r r
W
C
C
SCC
W
C

 









 , 
with πr equaling (C1r/C1), C1 total global consumption in the first time step.  
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 A fourth result, “Global,” ignores regional differences in consumption.  Let Ct and Pt 
denote, respectively, total global consumption and population at time t.  The Global SCC 
calculation means that, in equations (1) through (3) above, the double summation over times and 
regions is replaced by a single summation over times, and Ct and Pt are substituted, respectively, 
for Ctr and Ptr.  Global is used to facilitate comparison between our analysis and the many 
calculations of SCC in the literature that ignore regional differences in consumption.   
 All our results are in US dollars (2015 price levels) per ton of CO2 emission.  The RICE 
model uses “purchasing power parity” to convert foreign currency amounts into US dollars54.  
  Recall that parameter  η is the parameter of the well-being function, measuring individual 
risk aversion with respect to consumption gambles (used in both the discounted-utilitarian and 
non-discounted prioritarian SWF); ρ is the pure rate of time preference (used in the discounted-
utilitarian SWF); and γ is the degree of priority for the worse off (used in the non-discounted 
prioritarian SWF).  Figure 2 shows, in the left column, SCCDU for the normalization regions US, 
Africa, and World-Fair, as well as the Global calculation, as a function of η and ρ.  
    [Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here]  
In the right column of Figure 2 are displayed SCCNP for those normalization regions and the 
Global SCCNP, now as a function of η and γ, with czero set at the central value of $500.  In Figure 
2, these results are displayed as 3 dimensional graphs.  In Figure 3, the very same information is 
displayed, but in two-dimensional “contour” plots.  Extreme values of SCC (meaning values 
above $10,000) are truncated to $10,000.  
 The parameter η is the one common parameter of the two SWFs, and thus of SCCDU and 
SCCNP.  Figure 4 are one-dimensional sensitivity plots showing how SCCDU and SCCNP vary 
with η (given central values of the other parameters), for the three normalization regions and for 
Global.  
     [Insert Figure 4 here]  
  A number of key observations emerge from Figures 2 through 4.  (1) Time-preference (ρ) 
and priority for the worse off (γ) both function to prevent extreme values of the SCC.  With low 
values of the risk-aversion parameter η (at or near zero), the SCCDU with ρ = 0 takes on extreme 
values for all normalization regions and Global.  Holding constant η, increasing ρ reduces the 
SCCDU.  This is consistent with an argument sometime made in defense of positive time 
preference—namely, that zero time preference can require huge and intuitively unreasonable 
sacrifices from the present generation, to the extent their activities have effects on many future 
generations1,48,52. 
 However, it is important to see that positive time preference is not the sole mechanism for 
mitigating sacrifices from the present generation. The SCCNP also assumes extreme values with 
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low values of η if γ is set to zero, but these values diminish—without introducing a time 
preference—as γ is increased moderately.  Even with zero risk aversion η = 0, a very moderate 
level of the priority parameter γ > 0.5 suffices to avoid an extreme SCC.  The intuition is that 
reducing the consumption of the present generation so as to mitigate climate impact makes the 
present generation worse off; and at a certain point a further sacrifice is not ethically 
recommended, by prioritarians, even if the cost to the present generation of that additional 
reduction would be smaller than the undiscounted sum of future benefits.  
(2) Priority for the worse off (γ) is not time preference (ρ) under a different name.  The 
time-preference parameter ρ of the discounted-utilitarian SWF and the priority parameter γ for 
the non-discounted prioritarian SWF are conceptually quite different.  Nonzero values of ρ raise 
concerns about ethical neutrality between the generations that are not implicated by nonzero 
values of γ.  Our analysis demonstrates that a shift from ρ to γ makes a practical difference 
(Figure 3).  While γ and ρ do both function to mitigate extreme values of SCC for η near zero (as 
observed immediately above), SCCNP as a function of γ for a given value of η is generally quite 
different (as γ ranges from 0 to 3) than SCCDU as a function of ρ (with ρ ranging from 0 to 3%).  
This can be seen by comparing the color patterns across the rows in each of the four contour 
figures in the left column of Figure 3, with the patterns in the corresponding figures in the right 
column. Analytically, it can be shown that SCCDU always decreases with an increasing rate of 
time preference, but that SCCNP does not necessarily decrease with increasing γ (see Methods).  
Note that in the US, Global, and World-Fair normalizations, SCCNP is little changed with 
increasing γ for larger values of η. 
 (3) At the central parameter values, the non-discounted prioritarian SCC is greater than 
the discounted-utilitarian SCC.  This result refers to Figure 4—displaying SCCNP with ρ = 1 and 
czero = 500, and SCCDU with γ =1, each calculated as a function of the common parameter η.  In 
all cases, with η above the low level of 0.5, the SCCNP is larger than SCCDU—although the ratio 
between SCCNP and SCCDU never exceeds five and, as η increases, approaches or reaches unity.  
(With Africa as the normalizing region, SCCDU exceeds SCCNP for low η). 
 As an analytical matter, it is not obvious whether shifting from discounted utilitarianism 
to non-discounted prioritarianism will raise or lower the SCC.  On the one hand, removing the 
time-discount factor will tend to raise the SCC; on the other hand, inserting a priority parameter 
will tend to lower the SCC, to the extent the normalizing region is worse off than future affected 
regions. In our modelling exercise based on the RICE model, we find that the net effect of these 
two changes is to increase SCCNP relative to SCCDU.  
 The magnitude of the SCCNP values for the US normalizing region, which lie in the range 
$1500 to $3000, is—perhaps—surprising.  Note, however, that SCCDU-US values are also quite 
large, and that the choice of Africa or World-Fair normalization brings down the values 
substantially for both SCCs.  The choice of normalization region clearly matters a great deal for 
both SCCDU and SCCNP. A dollar cost in the US doesn’t have the same social-welfare impact as 
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in Africa, or spread proportionately across the globe—in the case of the discounted-utilitarian 
SWF, because of the declining marginal utility of money (with η > 0); in the case of the non-
discounted prioritarian SWF, because of that and the additional priority for the worse off that 
occurs with γ> 0.  For similar reasons, the Global estimates of both SCCNP and SCCDU are much 
lower than the regionally disaggregated estimates with the US as normalizing region.  
 (4) Individual risk aversion (η), priority for the worse off (γ), and the zero level of 
consumption (czero) interact in complex ways to determine the magnitude of the prioritarian SCC. 
Our discussion, thus far, has focused on comparing discounted utilitarianism and non-discounted 
prioritarianism.  We now briefly review the effect of the three parameters η, γ and czero within the 
prioritarian framework.   
Analytically, the effect of γ on SCCNP is complex: if the normalizing region (as with 
Africa or Global) is poorer at present than all future regions, SCCNP will decrease as γ increases.  
But SCCNP can, in principle, decrease or increase with γ with a richer normalizing region (US) or 
a composite normalization (World-Fair).  Similar points hold true of czero.  The effect of η on 
SCCNP is yet more complex: even with a normalizing region that is worse off than future regions, 
SCCNP might decrease or increase with η.  Some of these non-monotonicities can indeed be 
observed in the contour figures in the right column of Figure 3.  See Methods for analysis. 
 Figure 5 displays the SCCNP as a function of czero, γ and η, in each case with the other 
parameters set at their central values.  
    [Insert Figure 5 here] 
The impact of czero on SCCNP is not trivial, but is clearly less substantial than that of η and γ.  η 
and γ  have a similar range and pattern of impact on SCCNP for Africa, World-Fair, and Global, 
but not for US. 
Conclusion 
 Climate change mitigation and adaptation policies cannot ignore distributional 
considerations. As emphasized by the recently approved Sustainable Development Goals, 
poverty and inequality are intimately connected to the problem of climate change; the issues 
cannot be sealed off from each other.  We introduce a framework, prioritarianism, that 
seamlessly integrates distributional considerations—via a priority parameter (γ) specifying the 
degree of extra weight given to welfare changes affecting the worse off.  We use the integrated 
assessment model RICE to show how the prioritarian social cost of carbon SCC is a function of γ 
as well as individual risk aversion η and a zero level of consumption czero—by contrast with the 
discounted-utilitarian SCC, which depends upon η and a time preference factor (ρ).  
 Not surprisingly, the level of γ is one major driver of the prioritarian SCC. Choosing this 
level is a normative judgment; such judgments cannot be avoided in climate policy. The 
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utilitarian SCC, in effect, sets γ to zero—this too is a normative judgment, and one that is quite 
contestable.   
METHODS 
Range of Values of η 
 The CRRA well-being function is u(c) =
1 1(1 ) c    .  Recent empirical studies on 
investment choices find support for such CRRA well-being functions55,56. If calibrated from 
individual preferences, this generally assumes that individuals have identical preferences over 
consumption gambles, parameterized by a common coefficient of relative risk aversion η.  The 
empirical literature often finds estimated values for η between 0.5 and 3 57–60. A more nuanced 
well-being function would allow for heterogeneous preferences19, with individual-specific values 
of η, but this has not been implemented in climate economics and is rarely done in SWF 
scholarship more generally5. IAMs, the climate discounting literature and recent works on the 
SCC generally use values in the [0.5, 3] range9,32,52 with a most common value at η=1 61–63. 
 
The Specific Parameters of the NP SWF: czero and γ 
 What follows is a summary discussion of topics that are treated in detail in Adler7, and 
Adler and Treich19. 
 The CRRA well-being function is unique up to a positive affine transformation.  Assume 
that u(c) =
1 1(1 ) c     represents an individual’s preferences with respect to consumption 
gambles.  Then so does u+(c) = au(c) + b, with a positive.  This is a standard feature of so-called 
“expected utility” functions, such as the CRRA function64. 
 The DU SWF is invariant to positive affine transformations of the well-being function.  
Let Ctr be the consumption of region r at time t in one state of the world; Ctr′ its consumption in 
an alternative state; and u+(.) a positive affine transformation of u(.). Note now that  
  
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
T R T R
tr tr
tr trt t
t r t rtr tr
C C
P u P u
P P     

    
 
    
         
  
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
T R T R
tr tr
tr trt t
t r t rtr tr
C C
P u P u
P P 
 
 
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
    
 
   . 
Further, this invariance property is independent of the issue of time-discounting; it holds true 
even if ρ is set to zero in the above equations, so that we have non-discounted utilitarianism. 
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 By contrast, the NP SWF in the generic form of summing an increasing, concave function 
of individual well-being is not invariant to a positive affine transformation of the well-being 
function. Let g(.) be any increasing, concave function.  Then in general it is not the case that 
    
1 1 1 1
( ( )) ( ( ))
T R T R
tr tr
tr tr
t r t rtr tr
C C
P g u P g u
P P   

      
       
   
1 1 1 1
( ( )) ( ( ))
T R T R
tr tr
tr tr
t r t rtr tr
C C
P g u P g u
P P
 
   

      
 However, it is possible for an NP SWF to be invariant to a positive ratio transformation 
of the well-being function.  Let u++(.) be a positive ratio transformation of a given u(.), i.e., 
u++(c) = au(c), with a positive.  Then an NP SWF is invariant to a positive ratio transformation if 
the following holds true: 
   
1 1 1 1
( ( )) ( ( ))
T R T R
tr tr
tr tr
t r t rtr tr
C C
P g u P g u
P P   

      
        
   
1 1 1 1
( ( )) ( ( ))
T R T R
tr tr
tr tr
t r t rtr tr
C C
P g u P g u
P P
 
   

      
It can be shown that an NP SWF has this ratio invariance property if and only if the g(.) function 
has the power (“Atkinson”) form: g(u) = (1−γ)−1u1−γ, with γ > 0.  In the special case of γ = 1, g(u) 
= log u. 
 Moreover, ratio invariance provides a powerful argument for the Atkinson g(.), as 
compared with other g(.) functions.  If the NP SWF using a given g(.) is not invariant to a 
positive ratio transformation, this means that two well-being functions u(.) and u++(.) with 
identical information about well-being levels, differences, and ratios produce different rankings 
of outcomes when inputted into the SWF.  But it is normatively implausible that an SWF should 
depend upon information above and beyond well-being level, difference, and ratio information. 
 Given some well-being function u(.) unique up to a positive affine transformation, we 
identify a corresponding u*(.) unique up to a positive ratio transformation by identifying a “zero 
bundle.”  In the case where u(.) is defined on individual consumption, this means, specifically, 
identifying a zero level of consumption, czero, and setting u*(c) = u(c) –u(czero).  Note that u*(.) 
preserves all of the information in u(.) concerning well-being levels and differences. 
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 To simplify the presentation, consider now the NP SWF of the Atkinson form defined in 
terms of the consumption amounts of N individuals (rather than in terms of regional total 
consumption and population).  Let ci be the consumption of individual i, and u*(ci) = u(ci) –
u(czero) .  Let w(.) be the SWF, defined on a vector of N well-being numbers. 
w = 
* *
1( ,..., )Nw u u  = w(u*(c1), …, u*(cN)) = 
1 1(1 ) *( )ii u c
     or log *( )iiw u c  for 
γ =1 
For a given individual i, the marginal ethical impact of well-being,
*
i
w
u


 , equals 
*( )iu

 or, 
equivalently, [u(ci) –u(czero)]−γ.  The marginal ethical impact of consumption, 
*
*
i
i i
duw
u dc


, equals 
*
*( ) ii
i
du
u
dc

or, equivalently,  [u(ci) –u(czero)]−γu′(ci), with u′(.) the first derivative of u(.). 
 It is important to note that the Atkinson NP SWF requires well-being numbers to be non-
negative.  If 
*
iu  < 0, the function 
1 * 1(1 ) ( )iu
    is either undefined or, if defined, not both 
increasing and concave.  Note further that if γ ≥ 1, the function is undefined with * 0iu  .  We 
therefore require that 
*
iu  > 0.  
 These observations and formulas can be used to guide deliberation about the two 
parameters czero and γ.  Consider first czero.  The meaning of negative consumption is unclear; and 
the CRRA well-being function u(c) = 
1 1(1 ) c     (log(c) for η =1) is undefined for c = 0 if η 
≥1.  We therefore require that czero > 0.  Conversely, czero must be smaller than any observed 
consumption amount in the outcomes being analyzed.  Assume that there is some ci such that ci ≤ 
czero.  Then 
*
iu =u*(ci) = u(ci) –u(c
zero) ≤ 0 (for any well-being function that increases with 
consumption, such as the CRRA function), in violation of the requirement that  
*
iu  > 0. Thus, as 
mentioned in the text, we require czero for our analysis to be positive but less than the smallest 
per-capita consumption (Ctr/Ptr) for any time-region pair.    
 Within this range, czero is such that it functions as a point of absolute ethical priority.  
Consider two individuals i and j with consumption amounts ci < cj, both greater than czero.  The 
well-being ratio K, richer to poorer, is * */j iu u  .  Note now that the ratio between the marginal 
ethical impact of well-being for the two individuals (the poorer individual in the numerator) is 
* * * *
( ) ( )
( ) / ( ) ( / )
( ) ( )
zero
j
i j j i zero
i
u c u c
u u u u K
u c u c

    
 
      
 .  As ci gets closer and closer to c
zero, 
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holding fixed cj, K
γ approaches infinity and the ratio of marginal ethical well-being impacts 
approaches infinity.  
  The ratio between the marginal ethical impact of consumption for the two individuals is
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
zero
j i
zero
i j
u c u c u c
u c u c u c

  
    
.  This ratio also approaches infinity as ci gets closer and closer to c
zero, 
for the CRRA well-being function and any other such that well-being is increasing in 
consumption at a diminishing rate. 
 Consider now the specification of γ.  “Leaky transfer” thought experiments are one 
method for doing so.  Consider a policy that produces a small reduction Δu* in the well-being of 
the better-off individual j; produces a small increase fΔu* in the well-being of the worse-off 
individual i, with 0 < f  ≤ 1; and leaves everyone else’s well-being unchanged. If f =1 (a “pure 
transfer”), the NP SWF sees the policy as an ethical improvement.  We can now ask: what is the 
smallest value f for which the policy is an ethical improvement?  Equivalently, what is the 
maximum ethically acceptable leakage rate, 1 – f?  Note that the change in w produced by a loss 
of Δu* by j is approximately *( *)( )ju u
  , while the change in w produced by a gain of fΔu* by 
i is approximately 
*( *)( )if u u
 —for small ∆u* — and so the smallest value of f is 
approximately * *( / ) 1/i ju u K
  , with the maximum acceptable leakage rate 1 – 1/Kγ.  For a 
fixed K, f decreases and the maximum acceptable leakage rate increases as γ increases.  For 
example, if the better-off individual is at twice the level of well-being of the worse off 
individual, with γ =1 the maximum ethically acceptable leakage rate is 50%.  With γ = 2 it 
becomes 75%, and with γ = 3 it is 87.5%.  If the ratio increases to K = 3, then these maximum 
acceptable rates become, respectively, 67% (γ =1), 89% (2), and 96% (3). 
 To be sure, thought experiments in terms of transfers of well-being (u*) between 
individuals at a given well-being ratio K have the advantage of being independent of a specific 
well-being function, but the disadvantage of being somewhat abstract.  Alternatively, we can 
consider hypothetical leaky transfers of consumption between better- and worse off individuals.  
If a policy decreases individual j’s consumption by a small Δc, and increases i’s consumption by 
fΔc, the smallest value f for which the policy is an ethical improvement is approximately 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
zero
ji
zero
j i
u cu c u c
u c u c u c

  
    
 .  (This is just the inverse of the formula above for the ratio of marginal 
ethical impacts of consumption.) 
 Let’s now assume a CRRA well-being function for u at the central value of η =1, i.e., u(c) 
= log c, u′(c) = 1/c.  If czero is 500, then f equals 
[log log(500)]
[log log(500)]
i i
j j
c c
c c




 .  For the sake of 
illustration,  let cj = $40,000 (a moderately high level of individual annual income in the US) and 
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ci = $20,000 (an average level).  Then with γ =1 the maximum acceptable leakage rate in income 
for a small income transfer to the worse off individual is 58%; with γ =2 it becomes 65%; with γ 
=3, 70%.   
 Several studies have attempted to estimate γ based on the “leaky transfer” thought 
experiment. These studies usually consider transfers in consumption or income rather than in 
utility, and estimate a so-called “inequality aversion” parameter that combines the effects of γ 
and η. For instance, Amiel et al.65 conduct surveys for groups of students from two different 
countries, and find that the estimated median value for inequality aversion is between 0.1 and 
0.2. An alternative approach is to present survey respondents with a choice between different 
income distributions in hypothetical options. In one of the options, the mean income is low and 
the income dispersion small; in another the mean income is higher but the income distribution 
more dispersed. Carlsson et al.66, in their experiment with Swedish students, found that the 
median value for inequality aversion lies between 1 and 2. Using a representative sample of 
Finnish people, Pirtttila and Uusitalo67 show that the median value for inequality aversion of the 
respondents in a leaky bucket case lies below 0.5, while it is larger than 3 in the preferred income 
distribution treatment. Moreover, they show that both measures of inequality aversion predict 
well the respondents' opinions on the proper role of the welfare state, such as the level of 
taxation, tax progressivity and the scope of unemployment benefits. There exist also some 
studies examining preference towards (in-)equality in health. There is ample evidence that 
utilitarianism is rejected in the health domain, and that people agree to give priority to the most 
severely ill68. Dolan et al. find estimates for inequality aversion in health that vary from 1.55 to 
7.32 69. These studies are discussed in Adler (pp. 397-399)7. 
 A different kind of thought experiment for specifying γ is an “equalization” thought 
experiment.  Imagine that the policy equalizes the two individuals’ well-being levels at some 
intermediate level U*, without affecting anyone else’s welfare.  Let π be the ratio between the 
total well-being of the two individuals with the policy, and initially.  That is, π = * *2 * /( )i jU u u  .  
If π ≥ 1, the policy is an ethical improvement for any NP SWF.  We can now ask: what is the 
minimum value of π (πmin) above which the policy remains an ethical improvement?  1−πmin is 
the maximum acceptable percentage loss in the total welfare of the two individuals for the sake 
of perfect equalization.  It can be shown that 1 – πmin equals: 
1/(1 )
12 1
1
1 2
K
K
  
  
  
 (or 
1 2 / (1 )K K   in the case of γ =1), which increases with γ.   
This way of thinking about γ tends to make higher values seem less “extreme.” For 
example, if K = 2, 1 – πmin is 6% for γ =1; 11% for γ =2; and 15% for γ =3.  If K =3, the values 
are 13% (γ=1), 25% (γ =2), and 33% (γ =3).  Leaky transfer thought experiments involve 
marginal (small) transfers in well-being, and thus the maximum acceptable leakage approaches 
100% as γ gets large; while equalization thought experiments involve inframarginal transfers in 
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well-being, and the maximum acceptable percentage loss in total well-being is bounded above by 
1 – 2/(1+K), i.e., 33% for K =2, 50% for K =3, etc.  
 
 
Implementing the SCC in RICE 
 We use the integrated assessment models RICE for our numerical results. The RICE 
results were generated using a re-coded version of RICE called Mimi-RICE.jl that produces 
identical results as the original Excel version of RICE-2010 that was developed by Bill 
Nordhaus37. Mimi-RICE.jl is open source and will be made available on github.com at time of 
publication.  
The RICE model is a standard integrated assessment model of climate change economics 
and has been widely used in the peer-reviewed literature and policy analysis. The model has 
simple natural science components that estimate the effect of emissions on temperature. It is 
regionally disaggregated and it estimates the welfare impacts of a change in climate for different 
regions of the world separately. A complete description of the model is beyond the scope of this 
article. We point the interested reader to the model documentation at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/RICEmodels.htm. The estimation of the SCC 
followed a simple procedure. We first estimated a matrix 
trC of impacts caused by an additional 
ton of CO2 emission in the present. In a second step we used those estimates and the equations 
for the SCC that are derived in the next section (SCCDU and SCCNP) to compute our results. 
The matrix 
trC for the model was created by running the model first for a business as 
usual scenario, and then for a second scenario with a small additional emission impulse in the 
present. The difference between consumption levels (net of impacts) between these two runs was 
recorded for each timestep and region as the 
trC variable. 
Analytical Results regarding the Parameters of the DU SWF 
 Recall that the SCC is defined as 
1 1
1
T R
tr
t r tr
B
W
C
C
W
C
 






 .  For the DU SWF (equation 1 in the 
main text), 
1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
tr tr
t t
tr tr tr
C CW
u
C P P

 

 

    
  
  .  To reduce clutter, let ctr be per 
capita consumption in region r at t, i.e., Ctr/Ptr.  Then we have that: 
16 
 
  1
1
1 1
1
( )
(1 )
T R
DU B
tr t
t r tr
c
SCC C
c

  
 

  . 
 To see the effect of ρ and η on SCCDU, consider, respectively 
DUSCC



 and 
DUSCC



 .  
It is straightforward from the above equation that 
DUSCC



<0, since t ≥ 1 and ρ ≥ 0 (zero or 
positive time discount). 
 1 1
1
1 1
1
( ) log( )
(1 )
DU T R
B B
tr t
t r tr tr
c cSCC
C
c c

   

    
 
   
Note that every term in this formula following ΔCtr is positive except log(c1B/ctr), which is 
negative if c1B < ctr and positive if c1B > ctr.  Thus 
DUSCC



is unambiguously negative iff per 
capita consumption in the normalization region at time 1 (c1B) is less than per capita 
consumption in every time/region pair that experiences a climate impact (every ctr s.t. ΔCtr > 0). 
Analytical Results regarding the Parameters of the NP SWF 
 For the NP SWF (equation 2 in the main text),  
1 1( )
[ ( ) ( )] ( )
1
zero
zero tr
tr tr tr
tr
c cW
u c u c u c c
C
 
 


 
        
  
 , assuming η≠1.  Thus  
 
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
( )
( )
zeroT R
NP B B
tr zero
t r tr tr
c c c
SCC C
c c c
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
   
 .  
 Consider, in turn, 
NPSCC



  , 
NP
zero
SCC
c


, and 
NPSCC



 . 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
log
( ) ( )
zero zeroNP T R
B B B
tr zero zero
t r tr tr tr
c c c c cSCC
C
c c c c c
 
   
   
   
   
 
      
      
       
  . 
Note that the term 
1 1
1
1 1
( )
( )
zero
B
zero
tr
c c
c c
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is always positive but less than 1 if c1B < ctr, and greater 
than 1 if c1B >ctr.  Hence the logarithm of this term is negative if c1B < ctr, and positive if c1B >ctr.  
Since all other terms in the formula to the right of ΔCtr are positive, we have that 
NPSCC



is sure 
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to be negative if and only if per capita consumption in the normalization region at time 1  is less 
than per capita consumption in every time/region pair that experiences a climate impact.  In the 
case of η = 1, i.e., u(c) = log c, the expression c1−η in the equation above is replaced by log(c) and 
the same result about the sign of 
NPSCC



holds true. 
 1 1 11 1 11 1
1 1 1 1 2
1 1
( 1)( )( )
( ) [ ( ) ]
zerozeroNP T R
tr BB B
trzero zero zero
t r tr tr tr
c c cc c cSCC
C
c c c c c c
     
   


    
   
 
    
     
     
  , assuming 
η≠1. 
 Note that every term in the summation to the right of ΔCtr is always positive, except the 
last.  The last is negative if ctr > c1B and positive if ctr < c1B.  Thus, we have a similar result as for
NPSCC



, namely that 
NP
zero
SCC
c


 is unambiguously negative iff per capita consumption in the 
normalization region at time 1 is less than per capita consumption in every time/region pair that 
experiences a climate impact. This also holds true for η =1 (not shown). 
NPSCC



presents a more complicated case.  Let’s use Z as an abbreviation for 
1 1
1
1 1
( )
( )
zero
B
zero
tr
c c
c c
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .  
11 1
1 1
log
NP T R
B B
tr
t r tr tr
c cSCC Z
C Z Z
c c

 
 

 
     
      
     
  for η ≠1. 
Note that if c1B < ctr, the log of the ratio is negative, but 
Z



can be positive.  Thus the sign of
NPSCC



is ambiguous even if per capita consumption in the normalization region is less than per 
capita consumption in every time/region pair that experiences a climate impact(ΔCtr > 0). 
 An example will illustrate the ambiguity of the effect of   on SCCNP. Assume for 
instance T=2, R=1, ∆Ctr=1, czero=1, γ =2, c1B=2 and ctr =4 so that the SCC formula above for 
NPSCC simplifies to
1
2
1 2
2 1 1 2
( ) ( )
4 1 2 (2 2 )
NPSCC
 

 



 
 
; it is then easy to see that this formula 
increases with   until 1   and then decreases with  . 
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FIGURES     Figure 1 
 
Transformed utility function g(u).  The prioritarian SWF sums individual well-being numbers 
transformed by an increasing, concave function g(.).  This graph shows how the effect of that 
transformation is to give greater weight to well-being changes affecting worse-off individuals.  Consider 
two individuals, one at a lower well-being level u1, the second at a higher well-being level u2.   Because 
the g(.) function is concave, a change in the first individual’s well-being by amount Δu has a bigger 
impact on her g-transformed well-being than a change in the second individual’s well-being by the same 
amount Δu.  This also means that a pure transfer of well-being of Δu from the second individual to the 
first increases the value of the prioritarian SWF, i.e., the sum of g-transformed well-being numbers.  
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    Figure 2 
 
SCCDU and SCCNP for different normalization regions as a function of η, ρ, and γ: Wireframes.  
The left panel displays the discounted-utilitarian SCC (SCCDU), as a function of η (eta) and ρ (rho), for 
the normalization regions Africa and the US, as well as the Global and World-Fair SCCDU values.  The 
right panel displays the nondiscounted prioritarian SCC (SCCNP), as a function of η (eta) and γ (gamma), 
with czero at the central value of 500—again for the normalization regions Africa and the US, as well as 
Global and World-Fair. All results are in 2015 USD.  Values above $10,000 are truncated to $10,000.
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     Figure 3 
 
SCCDU and SCCNP for different normalization regions as a function of η, ρ, and γ: Heatmaps.  
This figure displays the same information as Figure 2, but using “heatmaps” with the colors 
corresponding to ranges of the value of the SCC as displayed in the rectangle at the bottom of the figure.  
The “heatmap” format clearly illustrates the comparative effect of γ (gamma) on SCCNP, as compared to 
the effect of ρ (rho) on SCCDU, for a common value of η (eta). 
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      Figure 4 
  
 
The magnitude of SCCDU and SCCNP at central parameter values.  Each of the four panels contains 
two line graphs: one showing the effect of η (eta) on the discounted utilitarian SCC (SCCDU), with ρ held 
at the central value of 1%; the second showing the effect of η (eta) on the non-discounted prioritarian 
SCC (SCCNP), with γ (gamma) held at the central value of 1 and czero at the central value of 500.  The four 
panels display this information for the normalization regions Africa and US, as well as for the Global and 
World-Fair calculations.  All results are in 2015 USD. 
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     Figure 5 
   
 
 Sensitivity analysis for the parameters of SCCNP.    Each of the four panels contains three line 
graphs. Each line displays the value of SCCNP as a function of one of its three parameters—γ (gamma), η 
(eta), and czero—across the entire range of values for that parameter, with the other two parameters held at 
central values.  The range of γ is (0, 3), with a central value of 1; the range of η is (0, 3), with a central 
value of 1; the range of czero is from $1 to $828.25, with a central value of $500.  The four panels display 
this information for the normalization regions Africa and US, as well as for the Global and World-Fair 
calculations. All results are in 2015 USD.  
 
